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1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological innovations are supported by the technological inventions, 
which have the following two features. First, technological inventions have 
the characteristic of public goods. Since they are a kind of information, the 
discoverer of such an invention cannot exclude other persons from using it. 
Also many people can use it simultaneously. These features of technological 
inventions induce non-discoverers' (non-inventors') imitation of them, and 
discourage researchers or inventors from creating them. Secondly, techno-
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logical inventions are associated with other technologies. When the dis-
coverers or inventors of plural distinct technological inventions differ, how 
does the coordination make among the discoverers affect the interest of 
each discoverer or inventor, and also affect their R&D incentives of them. 
Over the past decade of the last century, a number of studies have been 
discussed on the effects of the relations among technological inventions 
upon the R&D activities, the licensing or the patent systems. 
The technological inventions of the type of cumulative relations in which 
one (some) of them is (are) developed or worked out on the basis of other 
preceding one(s). Under such cumulative technological innovations, Green 
and Scotcher(1995), Chang(1995) show(s) that the externality due to the 
lack of the coordination among the discoverers of plural distinct technolog-
ical inventions decreases their incentives to create or develop them. 
Another feature of the relations among the technological inventions is the 
complementary relation among them. As we typically have seen in the IT 
(Information Technologies) industries, technological innovations occur on 
the basis of plural distinct technological inventions invented (developed) 
in different systems of technologies. In this environment, distinct tech-
nologies are technologically complementary for the product produced by 
making use of them. Of course, in such a complementary technological 
innovation, the externality problem due to the lack of the coordination 
among the discoverers of plural complementary technologies does occur. 
Heller and Eisenberg(1998) point out that the existence of such externality 
brings the result known as "the tragedy of anti-commons:" When the prop-
erty rights of plural distinct technologies are authorized to different agents 
(firms), the externality brings excessive exercises of the exclusive rights, 
and under-utilization of these technologies, and discourages incentives for 
R&D activities of agents(firms). 
In the case where a product is produced by utilizing such complementary 
inventions, a (cross-) licensing for them has strategic importance. If two 
different firms have one of the two distinct technological inventions with a 
perfect complementarity, then they cannot produce a product at all with-
out a (eross-) licensing for them. In practice, as the positive analyses in 
the appliance and IC industries conducted by Grindley and Teece(1997) 
and Hall and Ziedonis(2001) show us, the conditions of the firms' (eross-) 
licensing for the product have a great effect on their incentives for R&D 
activities in such industries where perfectly complementary technological 
inventions are indispensable for producing the product . In economic liter-
atures, however, there have been made few theoretical studies on how the 
conditions of the firms' (cross-) licensing for the product affect firms' incen-
tives for R&D activities. Fershtman and Kamien(1992) does analyze how 
a cross-licensing affect firms' incentives for R&D activities in their semi-
nar study in such a context. But they consider four stage model in order 
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to focus on a dynamic prospect of technological innovation. That is, in 
their model, the first stage involves initial research in which the firms start 
to develop the two complementary technologies. Once they have succeed 
in developing at least one of the two technologies the firm can decide to 
licence--stage 2- or to go to stage 3 and to continue the innovation race. 
When at least one of the firms possesses both technologies, either through 
licensing or through their own development, the game is in the stage 4 and 
they produce their goods and interact in the market. However, in practice, 
the pace of innovation race of the complementary technologies is very high 
and the life of each technologies in that it has economic values is very short 
especially in the IT industries. So their model setting in which has two 
research stages is not suitable for our analysis. 
Hence, in this paper, we make a analysis on how a cross-licensing affects 
firms' incentives for R&D activities in a Cournot duoply model in which 
there are one of the innovation race stage, one of decision on licensing 
and one production competition stage. When one of the firms succeeds 
in developing both technologies, the market becomes a monopolistic one 
since the firm has no incentive to licence unilaterally its technologies to its 
rival. So note that the only licensing that may occur is a cross-licensing 
when each firm succeeds in only one of distinct technology of the two. 
Therefore, in our analysis, we focus on the case where each duopolistic 
firm can invest on R&D for the two distinct technological inventions with 
strong complementarity with each other. But we conduct our analysis by 
a static model with respect to each firm's R&D investment since we does 
not treat dynamic aspects of technological innovations. 
In section 2, we describe our model, and analyze the problem of R&D in 
Cournot duopoly with perfectly complementary technological innovations 
without licensing as a benchmark in section 3. In section 4, at first, we ex-
amine the conditions under which (cross-) licensing occur. Then, extending 
our analysis to the case with a (cross-) licensing, we examine how the exis-
tence of a (cross-) licensing system firms' incentives for R&D activities in a 
Cournot duoply. In the final section, we present our concluding remarks. 
2. MODEL 
Let us consider a duopolistic market in which a homogeneous product is 
produced and sold by two firms: Firm x and Firm y. At the first stage, 
each firm invests in R&D for the two distinct but perfectly complementary 
technologies, A and B simultaneously. By "the perfectly complementary 
technologies", we mean that each firm cannot produce the goods without 
both of the two technologies. Denote by XA, XBC~. 0) and YA,X YBC~ 0) , 
the investment levels for the technologies A, B of firm x and the investment 
levels for the technologies A, B of firm y, respectively. When each firm 
4 OKAMURA ET AL. 
succeeds in the development of both of these two technologies or when by 
licensing, it become available to use both of technologies, it can produce its 
product. Assume that each finn has constant returns to scale production 
technology, so it ha a linear cost function, 
(1) 
,where c is a marginal cost of production and without loss of generality, 
we can assume that c = 0. At the end of the first stage, "nature" chooses 
whether each firm succeeds in the development of the technologies or not. 
Suppose that each firm succeeds in the development of the technology j 
with probability 
p(Yj) = 1 - e-Y; ,j = A, B. (2) 
This probability function p(.) is well defined since we have, p'(.) > 0, 
p"(.) < 0, lim:c_op'(x) = 00. 1 
We also assume that are identically and independently distributed. And 
we may assume that k j = 1 each finn's marginal cost of the development ' 
of the technology j = A, B without loss of generality. 
The inverse market demand function of the product is given by, 
p = D(Q) (3) 
where p is the market price and Q is the aggregate output of production 
in the market, that is Q = qx + qy. We assume that D'(.) < 0, D"(.) < ° 
and this assumption guarantees the inner solutions of the monopoly and the 
duopoly equilibria. At the beginning of the second stage, each finn knows 
all successes or failures of the both firms' developments of the technologies. 
1 In this paper, we assume the effect of the R&D activity on a process innovation 
as a static one. These properties of the success probability function are similar 
ones for the dynamic "memory less" or "Poisson" patent race model associated 
with Reiganum(1982). In her model, the research technology is characterized by 
the assumption that a firm's probability of making a discovery and obtaining a 
patent at a point of time depends only on this firm's current R&D investment 
level and not on its past R&D experience. For Introductory illustration to the 
dynamic patent race model, see section 10.2 of Chap. 10 in Tirole(1989). 
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At the second stage, if a (cross-) licensing system is available, then each 
firm bargains to its rival and agrees a (cross-) licensing contract, and they 
divide the total profit due to the licensing according to the Nash bargaining 
solution. If the (cross-) licensing system is not available, then the game 
proceeds to the third stage. At the third stage, whether the market becomes 
a monopoly or a duopoly determines, and each firm chooses its quantity of 
output according to the market structure. That is, if the market succeeds in 
the developments of the two technologies, both of technologies are available 
to only one of the two firms, say firm x, the market becomes a monopoly at 
the beginning of the second stage. From the assumption presented before, 
the inner optimal solution output exists. Denote by q~, this output. Then 
the maximal profit 1£'~ (q~) is given by 
(4) 
However, if both technologies are available to all the two firms, then the 
market considered becomes a duopoly at the beginning of the second stage. 
Assume that they compete in Cournot way in the duopolistic market. From 
the assumption presented before, the inner optimal solution outputs qf and {j exist. Denote by l£'P(qf,qf)' Firm i' s profit, then it is given by 
D( C c) _ D( C c) C _ D . .../....._ 1£'. qi ,% - q. +% 'qi =1£' ,Jr1"1,,J-X,Y· (5) 
Here we assume that2 
(6) 
In the next section, we analyze the problem of R&D in duopoly with 
perfectly complementary technological innovation without licensing as a 
benchmark. 
3. R&D INVESTMENT WITHOUT (CROSS) 
LICENSING--A BENCHMARK-
In this section, we consider the case when the two firms cannot any 
(cross) licensing as a benchmark. After each firm invests in R&D of the 
two technologies at the first stage, nature chooses the outcome of each 
firm's development of these technologies. Denote the t th outcome by 
2When an inversed demand function is linear, then we can easily show that 
this assumption satisfied. 
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(h = [xt,Xf,ytA,ytB) E e, 
where Xl,yti E {O, l},j = A,B and Xl = 1, Y/ = 0 implies that Firm 
x succeed in the development of technology j,and that Firm Y fails to the 
development of technology j, respectively. Then all possible Ot s are 
01 = [1,1,1,0), O2 = [1,1,0,1), 03 = [1,1,0,0),04 = [1,1,1,1), 05 = 
[1,0,1, 1), 06 = [0,1,1,1). 
The cases when Firm x can produce its goods are three cases of monopoly 
by Firm x 
01 = [1,1,1,0), 02 = [1,1,0,1), 03 = [1,1,0,0) 
and the case of duopoly, 
04 = [1,1,1,1). 
In the other four cases, Firm x cannot produce the product at all from 
perfectly complementary technologies assumption. 
The expected profit of Firm x, 7rx (XA,XB,YA,YB) is given by 
(1 - e-XA )(l - e-XB )(l - e-YA )(l - e-YB )7rD 
+(1- e-XA )(1 - e-XB ){(l - e-YA )e-YB + 
(1 - e-YB )e-YA + e-YA • e-YB }7rM - XA - XB 
Firm x solves the following maximization problem: 
Max 7rx (XA,XB,YA,YB), given YA,YB 
.The first order condition w.r.t. XA is give by 
+e-XA (1 - e-XB ){ (1 - e-YA )e-YB 
(7) 
+ (1- e-YB )e-liA +e-lIA • e-YB }7rM -1 = 0 (8). 
Since all the probability functions p(.) 's are identical, we focus our analy-
sis on symmetric Nash equilibrium. Let s = e-XA = e-XB = e-lIA 
e-lIB = e-X • Then, the first order condition (8) is rewritten to 
8(1- 8)37r D + 82(1- 8)(2 - 8)7rM - 1 
CROSS-LICENSING SYSTEM 7 
(9). 
So 8 that satisfies with the equation (9) may constitute symmetric Nash 
equilibrium if it satisfies with the second order condition. We have 
and 
_e-XA (1- e-XB ){ (1 - e-lIA )e-lIB 
+(1- e-lIB )e-IIA + e-IIA • e-lIB }7rM , 
{j27r 
-::----::-=-x_ = e-XAe-XB (1- e-IlA)(1 - e-IIB)7rD 
OXBOXA 
+e-XA e-XB {(I - e-lIA )e-lIB 
+(1- e-lIB )e-lIA + e-lIA • e-IIB }7rM 
Let 8* that satisfies with the equation (9). Then 
and 






(13), where the last equality holds since s* satisfies the equation (9). 
Then, the second order condition is given by 
-1 < 0, 
-. 1-8· = 1 _ _8_ > 0 l IS. I (*)2 1~8. -1 1-8* 
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(13) . Since s = e- X is the probability that Firm x fails the development of 
the technology when it chooses its investment level x, we see that 0 ::; s· ::; 1 
From the fact described above, we can present the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3.1. Suppose that 7rD + 37rM > 16. Then, there exists 
a symmetric Nash equilibrium investment level 
x· = -lnsL > -In(!) 
in our R&D investment competition in completely complementary tech-
nologies without licensing system. 
Proof. Let the left hand side of the equation(9) </>(s), then </>(s) can be 
rewritten by </>(s) = [7rM -7rD ]s4_3[7rM _7rD ]S3+ [27rM -37rD ]s2+7rD s-l 
(14) 
From the assumption, 7rM - 7rD > 7rM - 27rD > O. So we have 
lims->+CXl </>(s) = lims->_CXl </>(s) = 00 (15). 
Furthermore, from (14) and the assumption of this proposition, we see 
that 
</>(0) = </>(1) = -1 < 0 and </>(1/2) = 7rDi~7rM -1 > 0 
(16). 
Also we have </>' (s) = (1 - s)2(1 - 4s)7rD + s( 4s2 - 9s + 4)7rM , so 
</>'(0) = 7rD > 0 and </>'(1) = _7rM < 0 
(17). 
From (17) and the intermediate value theorem, there exists at least one 
s E [0,1] such that </>'(s) = O. 
Now, let ),1,),2 and ),3 be the three roots of the equation </>' (s) = O. We 
have 
(s-),t}(s-),2)(s- ),3) = s3_( ),1+ ),2+ ),3)S2 + (),1),2 +),2),3 +),3),1)S-
),1),2),3 = 0 (18) 
Deviding </>(s) = 4[7rM -7rD ]s3_9[7rM -7rD ]s2+2[27rM -37rD ]s+7rD = 0 
by 4[7rM - 7rD ], 
we get 
(19). 
By comparing (18) and (19), we obtain 
(20), 




From (22), we can see that any of the following three cases holds: 
(i)all roots are negative, (ii)two roots are positive and one root is nega-
tive and (iii)two roots are imaginary roots 
and one root is negative. However, from (15), (16), (17), we see that the 
cases (i) and (iii) never occur. So we can 
the case (ii) occurs. Here suppose that 0 < ),1,),2 < 1 and ),3 < o. 
Then, ),1 +),2 +),3 < ),1 +),2 < 2 holds, 
but then this and (20) contradict each other. So we have one negative 
root, one positive root in {s : 0 < s < I} 
and one positive root in {s : s> I}. In addition to this argument and 
the fact that <p(s), 
the biquadratic function of s has at most three extreme points, we can 
conclude that <p( s) is unimodal in s E [0, 1] 
so it has a maximum point as shown by Figure 1. 
So we have two s* E (0,1) , say s:i, and sH such that 0 < s:i, < ~ < sH 
< 1. However, we see that only 81 « !) 
does satisfy with the seconsd order condition (13), and the result follows. 
I 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
4. R&D INVESTMENT(CROSS) LICENSING 
In this section, we consider the case when firms(firm) can license each 
other its technologies ifthey(it) succeed(s) in the development ofthe tech-
nology(technologies). We assume that they determine their licensing fee 
by Nash bargaining if they agree with their licensing contract. 
We can see the following two type of possible cases in which licensing 
may occur. We consider here the cases in which Firm x can licence its 
technology that it succeeds in the development by the symmetry of the two 
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firms. In 83 = [1,1,0,0]' the market becomes the monopoly of Firm x , so 
it has no incentive to licence its technologies to his rival. 
(Case 1)81 = [1,1,1,0] or 82 = [1,1,0,1] 
In this case, a unilateral licensing of one technology may occur from Firm 
x to Firm y. Consequently, the market becomes a duopoly. Denote by Nl 
the licence fee, the Nash Bargaining function Bl is given by 
Then we have 
BBI D D M M 





The profits of Firm x and Firm y after side payment are 
'lrM 'lrM 
'lrD + _ 'lrD 
2 ' 2 
respectively. Since the threat points of Firm x and Firm y are 'lrM, 0, , 
respectly and they are greater than the profits of Firm x and Firm y after 
side payment. So any licensing may not occur in this case. 
(Case 2)87 = [1,0,0,1] or 82 = [0,1,1,0] 
In this case, cross-licensing between Firm x and Firm y occurs. Conse-
quently, the market becomes a duopoly. Denote by N2 the licence fee, the 
Nash Bargaining function B2 is given by 
Then we have 
or equivalently 
The profits of Firm x and Firm y after side payment are identical 
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7rD 
From the above observation, The expected profit of Firm x with 
(cross-) licensing, i;(XA,XB,YA,YB) is given by 
7rx (XA,XB,YA,YB) 
+(1- e-XA)e-xB'e-YA(l- e-YB )7rD 
+e-XA (l_ e-XB )(l- e-YA)e-YB7rD 
(23). 
Note that the second term in the right hand side of (23) is the realized 
profit of Firm x in the case when Firm x succeeds in the development of 
the technology A and Firm Y does in that of the tehnology B. Similarly, 
the third term in the right hand side of (23) is the realized profit of Firm 
x in the case when Firm x succeeds in the development of the technology 
B and Firm Y does in that of the tehnology A. By using the symmetry, 
the first order condition w.r.t.xA can be written as 
07rx + -XA -XB -YA(l -YB) D 
-- e e e -e 7r 
OXA 
_e-XA (l_ e-XB )(l- e-YA)e-YB7rD 
4J(8) + s2(1- 8)(28 - l}rrD = 0 
(24). 
Define 1/1(s) == 4J(s) + 82(1- S)(28 - l)7rD = 4J(8) + (-284 + 383 - 82)7rD 
(25). 
Then, we have 1/1(0) = 4J(0) = 1/1(1) = 4J(1) = -1 (26). 
Since 1/1'(s) = 4J'(s) + 8( -882 + 9s - 2)7rD (27), 
we also have 1/1'(0) = 4J'(0) = 7rD > 0 (28) 
and 1/1'(1) = 4J'(1) - 7rD = -7rM - 7rD < 4J'(1) = _7rM < 0 (29). 
Rearranging 1/1(s) w.r.t. 8 yeilds 
1/1(8) = [7r M - 37rD ls4 - 3[7rM - 27rD ls3 + 2[7rM - 27rD 182 + 7rD 8 -1 (30). 
Then we obtain the following lemma on the extreme points of 1/1 ( 8). 
LEMMA 4.1. 1/1(8) has a unique maximum in [0,1]. 
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Proof. In order to examine the extreme points of 'IjJ(s),the first order 
condition is 'IjJ'(s) = 4[7r M -37rD]s3_9[7rM -27rD]s2+4[7rM _27rD]s+7rD = 0 
(31). Suppose that 7rM - 37rD ;f. O. Then, deviding both sides of (31) by 
4[7rM - 37rD] yeilds 
9[7rM - 27rD] [7rM - 27rD] 7rD 
s3_ s2+ s+ =0 
4[7rM - 37rD] [7rM - 37rD] 4[7rM - 37rD] 
(32). Using the relation between the roots of the cubic equation and coef-
ficients, we have 
(33), 
7rD 
A1A2A3 = - 4[7rM _ 37rD] 
(34). If 7rM - 37rD < 0, then we see that the right hand sides of (33) 
and (34) are negative and positive, respectively. So if all the three roots 
of (31) are real roots, then two of them are negative and one of them is 
positive. If (31) has one real root and two imaginary roots, then the real 
root must be positive since (34) has positive sign. In both cases, (31) has a 
unique positive real root. Taking this fact and (28), (29) into consideration, 
we can see that there exists the maximum in [0,1]. Next suppose that 
7rM - 37rD > O. Then, in tyhis case, we see that the right hand sides of ' 
(33) and (34) are positive and negative, respectively. Since the sign of (34) 
is negative, as we see on </J( s) in the proof of the proposition 3.1, we can see 
that any of the following three cases holds:(i)all roots are negative, (ii)two 
roots are positive and one root is negative and (iii)two roots are imaginary 
roots and one root is negative. However, from the signs of (33)and (34), we 
see that the cases (i) and (iii) never occur. So we can the case (ii) occurs. 
Here suppose that 0 < All A2 < 1 and A3 < O. Then, A1 + A2 + A3 < 
\ \ 2 9 9[.,..M _2.,..Dj h Ids' M 3 D 0 B t th thO A1 +A2 < < 4" < 4[.,..M_3.,..Dj 0 ,smce7r - 7r >. u en ts 
and the fact that the sign of (33) is positive contradict each other. So (31) 
has one negative root, one positive root in {s : 0 < s < 1} and one positive 
root in {s: s> 1}. So from this fact and (28), (29), we can see that there 
exists the maximum in [0,1]. Finally suppose that 7rM - 37rD = O. Then, 
form (30) we have 'IjJ(s) = -3[7rM - 27rD]s3 + 2[7rM - 27rD]s2 + 7rD s - 1 = 
-37rDs3+27rDs2+7rDs-1. So we also have'IjJ'(s) = -97rDs2+47rDs+7rD = 
O. Deviding both sides of this bY7rD(;f. 0) yeilds: -982+4s+1 = O. Solving 
this w.r.t. s, we get 
* 2±v'13 8 =---
9 
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So t/J(s) has a unique maximaum s* = 2+f3 in [0,11. So it has a maxi-
mum point as shown by Figure 2 and the lemma holds. I 
[Insert Figure 2 herel 
From (25), we can easily show that t/J(s) ~ </>(s) {::} s ~! (35). From 
(26), (27), (28), (29) and Lemma 4.1, we can present our main result with-
out proof. 
PROPOSITION 4.1. Suppose that 7rD + 37rM > 16. Then, there exists a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium investment level;; 
x* = - In s£ > ;; = -In s£ > - In(!) 
in our R&D investment competition in completely complementary tech-
nologies with licensing system. That is, the existence of licwnsing system 
discourages R&D investment in completely complementary technologies. 
From the proposition above, we see that the existence of a cross-licensing 
system discourages firm's R&D investments, when the duopolistic firms can 
produce goods by using the two completely complementary technologies, 
where any unilateral licensing cannot occur since firms needs both of the 
two technologies for their production of a product. An economic intuition 
of our result is that the existence of a cross-licensing system decreases 
firms' incentives for R&D through the chance of the exchanges of their 
technologies. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we explored the incentives for R&D investments of the 
duopolistic firms facing technological innovations in completely comple-
mentary technologies by analyzing a simple static innovation modeL At 
first, as a benchmark we derive symmetric Nash equilibrium investment 
levels in our R&D investment competition in completely complementary 
technologies without licensing system. Then we examine the conditions 
under which (cross-) licensing occur. Then, by deriving symmetric Nash 
equilibrium investment levels in our R&D investment competition in com-
pletely complementary technologies with licensing system, we examine how 
the existence of a (cross-)licensing system affects firms' incentives for R&D 
activities in a Cournot duoply. And we show that the existence of a cross-
licensing system discourages firm's R&D investments, when the duopolistic 
firms can produce goods by using the two completely complementary tech-
nologies, where any unilateral licensing cannot occur since firms needs both 
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of the two technologies for their production of a product. An economic 
intuition of our result is that the existence of a cross-licensing system de-
creases firms' incentives for R&D through the chance of the exchanges of 
their technologies. 
There remain many problems for future researches. First, in this paper, 
we focus on the symmetric equilibrium in order to make our analysis easy. 
In practice, however, firms cannot be symmetric in the industries where the 
complementary technologies are indispensable for the production of goods. 
In addition, the role of R&D ventures who do not produce products but 
concentrate on R&D, increases its importance in such industries. Secondly, 
in this paper, since we concentrate on the effect on the incentives for R&D, 
we did not examine the effects on the social welfare at the equilibrium. If we 
clarify how governments should plan and exercise the policy for technologies 
under complementary technological innovations, it is important for us to 
explore the implications on the economic welfare at the equilibrium in our 
model. 
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